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ABSTRACT
MAC address randomization is a common privacy protec-
tion measure deployed in major operating systems today. It
is used to prevent user-tracking with probe requests that are
transmitted during IEEE 802.11 network scans. We present
an attack to defeat MAC address randomization through
observation of the timings of the network scans with an off-
the-shelf Wi-Fi interface. This attack relies on a signature
based on inter-frame arrival times of probe requests, which
is used to group together frames coming from the same de-
vice although they use distinct MAC addresses. We propose
several distance metrics based on timing and use them to-
gether with an incremental learning algorithm in order to
group frames. We show that these signatures are consistent
over time and can be used as a pseudo-identifier to track
devices. Our framework is able to correctly group frames
using different MAC addresses but belonging to the same
device in up to 75% of the cases. These results show that
the timing of 802.11 probe frames can be abused to track
individual devices and that address randomization alone is
not always enough to protect users against tracking.
CCS Concepts
•Networks→Network privacy and anonymity; •Security
and privacy → Mobile and wireless security;
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wi-Fi devices are periodically sending frames containing a
unique identifier (the MAC address) which can be leveraged
to track the owners of those devices. As a countermeasure
against tracking, MAC address randomization is becoming
an industry standard and is being deployed in most major
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OSes: iOS since version 8 [9], Windows 10 [10], Android
6.0 [1] and Linux kernel 3.18 [5].
Recently, Vanhoef et al. [10] showed that probe requests
contain enough information to form a fingerprint of a device,
even without a reliable link-layer identifier. In the present
paper, we use even stronger conditions: we suppose that we
don’t have access to data-link layer information, except the
randomized MAC address. In other words, we go further
than this previous paper, supposing the previously demon-
strated flaws were fixed, and devices stopped adding identi-
fying information in probe requests.
Instead, we study the feasibility of tracking devices based
on timing information only. More particularly, we exploit
the fact that the frames sent by Wi-Fi devices follow regular
patterns that can be used for time-based fingerprinting [3].
The difficulty of such a technique, compared to classical
fingerprinting [3], is that we only have a small number of
frames to fingerprint a device. In many implementations,
random MAC addresses change after a small number of
frames have been sent. As a result, we can only gather a
small amount of information for each random MAC address.
Our solution has to work with this small quantity of infor-
mation, and has to be reliable at the same time. Besides,
as we do not know the number of devices communicating,
we cannot build a database of devices before the attack, we
have to restrict ourselves to incremental learning methods.
Thus, we have to build an hybrid attack that can reliably
cluster frames from an unknown number of devices.
This work makes the following contributions. First, we
show that the time-based signature is consistent over time,
making it a possible pseudo-identifier of a device. Then, we
propose an algorithm able to defeat MAC address random-
ization, in the sense that we are able to group frames from
the same device despite the use of random MAC addresses.
This attack only relies on timing information and is able to
reach an accuracy of up to 75%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
some background information. Section 3 details our algo-
rithm and its various components and parameters. Section 4
presents the results of the tests of our solution, and discusses
the efficiency of its parameters. Section 5 concludes the pa-
per.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Probe requests
In order to discover 802.11 networks, devices frequently
send probe request frames. These frames contain enough
Figure 1: Transmission sequence of frames with Inter-Frame
Arrival Time (IFAT) and burst that is a group of frames sent
by a device within a time window smaller than 10 ms.
information to identify a device in many cases [10]. For
most devices, frames are sent in groups within a small time-
frame (less than 10ms), each frame of the group containing
a different searched network name (SSID). Such groups of
frames are called bursts (see Figure 1).
2.2 MAC address randomization schemes
Linux supports MAC address randomization, and lets the
driver or firmware generate per-burst random MAC addresses.
Indeed, only recent firmware allow for changing the MAC
address at each burst but because manufacturers are slow in
updating the firmware of Wi-Fi devices, most Linux devices
change their MAC address at most every few bursts [5]. As
a result, most Linux devices change their MAC address at
most every few bursts. The default duration for a random
MAC address in wpa_supplicant is 60 seconds.
MAC address randomization is supported by iOS since
version 8. Randomization is limited to probing and only
happens under specific conditions: the device has to be unas-
sociated and in sleep mode [7]. We observe different kinds of
behaviour with an iPad 2 running iOS 9.1: the device usu-
ally changes its MAC address every few bursts (2-4 bursts),
and sometimes changes it for every burst. The conditions
for these different behaviors to happen are still to be deter-
mined.
Some implementations, such as the one in Windows 10 [6]
or the one used in the privacy-oriented Linux distribution
Tails do not change the MAC address regularly for Wi-Fi
service discovery. Windows 10 changes the MAC address
when the device connects or disconnects from a network, and
when it is restarted. For such implementations, tracking is
trivial since the device identifier does not change during a
tracking session.
To sum up, with current implementation of randomiza-
tion, the same MAC address is used over at least one burst
and can cover multiple consecutive bursts.
2.3 Related work
Franklin et al. showed that the wireless driver of Wi-Fi-
enabled devices can be fingerprinted using the inter-arrival
time of the probe requests [3]. They did not discuss the
efficiency of their method to distinguish individual devices.
As a single driver is used by a great number of devices, being
able to distinguish between devices adds a level of precision
necessary for tracking.
Freudiger performed an extensive study of Wi-Fi probe
requests [4]. The author showed how often certain devices
send such frames. He discovered that the number and the
frequency of probe requests sent by a device depend on their
number of known networks, which hints at the possibility to
more precisely fingerprint devices. More specifically, bursts
of probe requests are sent with different timings depending
on the number of configured networks. He also showed that
MAC address randomization can be defeated using sequence
numbers.
Wiedersheim et al. proposed a method to break pseudonym
in Inter-Vehicular Networks [11]. Using a technique called
Multiple Hypothesis Tracking, they reached accuracy of al-
most 100% to track vehicles changing their pseudonym every
10 seconds and sending one beacon message per second. This
algorithm makes a strong use of the position of the devices,
which is unknown in our case (or at best very imprecise with
RSSI), since we only have a single sensor.
Pang et al. showed how implicit identifiers can be used
to track devices and discussed how it rendered pseudonyms
insufficient to prevent tracking [8]. They studied several
link-layer fields used by associated devices and used a naive
Bayes classifier to distinguish between those devices. As we
focus on unassociated devices, we do not have access to most
of these fields.
2.4 Threat model
We consider an attacker able to monitor the wireless sig-
nals in the vicinity of the target, using one off-the-shelf
Wi-Fi card. Such an attacker can thus only monitor one
channel at a single location. We make this strong assump-
tion so as to show that the location information is not nec-
essary to track devices. This attacker has access to the tim-
ing information and the MAC address of each probe request
frame, but not more. We make this assumption to consider a
situation where the information leakage in Wi-Fi passive dis-
covery has been fixed, as the latter has already been shown
to allow device tracking [10].
The goal of this attacker is to distinguish the signals of
all devices in range from the crowd even though they use
MAC address randomization, and to track individual devices
among extended periods of time.
This simple attacker model can be further extended by
considering advanced techniques and using several sensors.
Adding the location information obtained by different sen-
sors would improve the accuracy of our algorithm.
This attacker model is complementary to the one used
in [11], which focuses on location information to track ve-
hicles using pseudonyms. In fact, both attacks could be
combined to defeat pseudonymization.
3. DEFEATING RANDOMIZATION USING
TIMING
We present an attack grouping probe requests together
based on the sending device despite the use of a chang-
ing link-layer identifier. To do so, we use a timing-based
method, which considers inter-frame arrival time (IFAT) be-
tween frames using the same MAC address. We compute
signatures for each group of frames using the same MAC ad-
dress and compare these signatures using custom distances.
3.1 Terminology
We introduce the following definitions:
• a burst is a group of probe request frames sent by a
device within 10ms,
• a burst set is a group of bursts sent with the same
(possibly random) MAC address,
• an alias of a MAC address is another (random) MAC
address used by the same device,
Algorithm 1: Random MAC breaking
Input: G: groups of burst sets, grouped by MAC
address
t: distance threshold
d: a distance function
Returns: A: dictionary of aliases
A ← ∅
D ← ∅ // Database of signatures
foreach B ∈ G do
S ← signature(B)
dmin ← min(d(S,S ′) where S ′ ∈ D)
if dmin < t then
A[B.mac]← A[S ′.mac]
else
A[B.mac]← B.mac
end
D ← D ∪ S
end
return A
• Inter-Frame Arrival Time (IFAT) is the time difference
between two frames.
Also, randomization will be used as short for MAC address
randomization throughout the paper.
3.2 Frame grouping algorithm
Our algorithm takes as input a capture of probe requests
and outputs a mapping between the frames and a set of iden-
tifiers. Ideally, each identifier should correspond to a distinct
device and its associated frames. The mapping is obtained
by grouping together frames that appear to originate from
the same device based on timing information. More partic-
ularly, our algorithm relies on timing-based distances and
on an incremental learning algorithm customized to fit the
constraints of our use case.
We build a database of time-based signatures for the dif-
ferent MAC addresses, as described in [3]. We divide time
into discrete timeframes of equal size (bins). For each group
G of frames using the same MAC address, we calculate the
inter-frame arrival time (IFAT) between each pair of consec-
utive frames. We then calculate the ratio and mean value
of IFATs in each bin, which constitutes the signature S(G)
for group G. For G, let PGb be the percentage of frames in a
bin b, and MGb the mean IFAT value in bin b. Let B be the
set of all possible bins, the signature S of group G is given
by:
S(G) = {PGb ,MGb |b ∈ B}
For each burst set, we calculate the distance between the
signature of this group and every other known signature. If
at least one of these distances is below a given threshold t, we
choose the MAC address of the signature yielding minimal
distance, and consider the two MAC addresses to belong to
the same device. Otherwise, we estimate the MAC address
to belong to a new device. We add the signature of the new
burst set to the database.
We consider two options for this algorithm:
• online: try to group burst sets with previous burst sets
only (as described in Algorithm 1).
• oﬄine: try to group burst sets with any burst set
3.3 Distance
The previous algorithm relies on a distance metric in or-
der to group frame together. In this section, we introduce
several timing-based distance metrics derived from the one
originally introduced by Franklin et al. [3].
3.3.1 Franklin’s distance
The first considered distance is a modification of the one
used by Franklin to fingerprint device drivers. We modify
Franklin’s distance formula so that it respects the symmetric
propriety of a distance. Instead of multiplying the difference
of the means by the percentage of a single device, we multi-
ply by the mean of the percentages of both devices.
The distance between two burst sets A and B is based on
their signatures. We calculate the distance D1AB using the
following formula:
D1AB =
∑
b∈B
(|PBb − PAb |+ (P
A
b + P
B
b )
2
∗ |MBb −MAb |)
Percentages and means are set to 0 if the bin is empty.
As our distance uses inter-frame arrival time, single frames
cannot be considered. We choose to ignore them.
3.3.2 Adding inter-burst set arrival time
As opposed to previous work, the number of frames on
which the fingerprint can be computed is limited to a small
number of bursts because the MAC address is changed peri-
odically (see section 2). To deal with this reduced amount of
information, we extend the previous distance by considering
inter-arrival time between the compared burst. The underly-
ing assumption is that bursts exhibit a temporal regularity.
Assuming a group B is composed of frames seen later than
those of group A, we calculate the IFAT between the last
frame of A and the first one of B: IFATAB = B.first −
A.last. We then check if this IFAT exists in the signature
S(A). If this is not the case, we consider the distance to be
+∞. Otherwise, we look at the percentage p of the signature
of the IFAT’s bin. We multiply the distance by 1− p.
So, if we call D2AB this new distance:
D2AB =
{
+∞ if IFATAB /∈ SA
(1− PAb ) ∗D1AB otherwise
In our algorithm, two burst sets with infinite distance will
never be grouped as they are assumed to have very few
chance to come from the same device.
3.3.3 Hybrid distance
Because of frame losses and delays in burst transmissions,
the previous distance metric may lead to a large amount of
false negatives. Therefore, we introduce D3, which consti-
tutes a trade-off between D1 and D2: instead of giving an
infinite value, we multiply D1 by a constant C (the choice
of the value of this constant is discussed in section 4.8). In
other words:
D3AB =
{
C ∗D1AB if IFATAB /∈ SA
(1− PAb ) ∗D1AB otherwise
As a result, this distance favors groups of frames having
a coherent IFAT with the current group, but seeks to group
frames even if no group with coherent IFAT is found.
3.4 Knowledge-keeping algorithm
Our algorithm groups burst sets together, and stores these
relationships in an internal structure. It does not use pre-
vious knowledge about aliases to group new-coming burst
sets, so as not to spread error to further grouping guesses.
In concrete terms, a new burst set is compared to each pre-
vious burst set. It can thus be compared to several burst
sets from a device.
Another way to proceed would be to use previous knowl-
edge of which burst sets are assumed to belong to the same
device by creating meta-groups of frames. Signatures of
these meta-groups would include more frames, making the
results possibly more accurate. A new burst set is then com-
pared once to each known device.
3.5 Nearest neighbors method
We consider an improvement of our algorithm by borrow-
ing the approach of the k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) algo-
rithm. When trying to group a burst set S with other burst
sets, we compute the distances with all other burst sets.
Instead of grouping S with the burst sets which yields the
lowest distance, we have a look at the k burst sets which
yield the lowest distances, and group S with the burst set
which is most present within those k burst sets.
With this modified algorithm, groups of frames from ran-
dom MAC addresses will score a low distance with all the
previous groups from the same device, and should then have
a better chance to be classified correctly.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We first evaluate our distances in order to find the most
efficient one to estimate if two groups of frames come from
the same device or from different ones. We then proceed
to improve the efficiency of our solution by overviewing the
impact of the different parameters: distance threshold, size
of the bins for the distance.
4.1 Dataset
In order to estimate our solution, we use a real-world
dataset free of random MAC addresses. This dataset of
more than 120 000 probe requests sent by over 550 devices
was collected in our laboratory, over a period of 6 days.
We transform it into a dataset containing devices changing
their MAC addresses every p bursts of probe requests. For
evaluation purpose, the resulting dataset keeps a trace of
which probe requests come from the same device despite
MAC address randomization. This allows us to keep the
ground truth data.
We generate a trace having 100 among the 550 devices
using random MAC addresses for burst sets of 4 bursts.
4.2 Distance metric evaluation
In order to evaluate the efficiency of our distance, we cal-
culate the distances between burst sets from the same de-
vices, as well as the distances between burst sets from differ-
ent devices. We then compare those two groups of distances
in order to see if our distance metric can be used to identify
if two burst sets come from the same device or from differ-
ent ones. We only do this for D1, as D2 and D3 will fail to
evaluate non-consecutive burst sets properly since they use
inter-burst arrival time.
Results can be seen in Figure 2. We observe that bursts
from distinct devices have a larger distance than the bursts
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of the distance D1 for
pairs of burst set from the same device and from distinct
devices.
from the same device, which confirms the utility of this dis-
tance for our attack.
4.3 Stability of the distance over time
In this section, we study the stability of the considered
distance over time in order to confirm that our algorithm
can work to track a device over an extended period of time.
To do so, we compute the distance between groups of frames
sent by the same device at distinct time intervals.
We consider several time differences between 1 minute and
up to 50 days. For each of them, we select 50 devices for
which frames separated by this time difference (±10%) are
available in our dataset. We take two groups of 1 minute
of these frames at each extremity of the time difference and
compute the distance between these groups. In order to have
data covering an extended time period, we use the Sapienza
dataset [2] as it covers 50 days, a longer time period than
our own. Thanks to this dataset, we can calculate the con-
sistency of the distance over long time periods.
The results are shown on figure 3. We observe an in-
crease of less than 50% even after 50 days, which seems low
enough to allow tracking devices over a long time period.
Values reached by the distance even after 50 days still make
a difference of 49% between the two kinds of burst sets in fig-
ure 2 (42% in the worst case), while the average distance for
burst sets with 1 minute of time interval make a difference
of 61%.
In our dataset and experimental conditions, we do not
observe the probable IFAT deviation mentioned by Freudi-
ger [4], observed when disabling Google services on Android.
4.4 Performance metrics
We evaluate the performances of the proposed algorithm
based on a number of metrics: accuracy, true positive rate
and false positive rate.
We define the accuracy metrics as being the ratio of cor-
rect decisions made by our algorithm. We define a correct
decision as being either:
• a burst set using a random MAC address correctly
grouped with another burst set from the same device;
• a burst set from a device not using a random MAC
address not grouped with any other burst sets (i.e. a
group of frames from a device using a normal MAC
address is not grouped with frames from another de-
vice).
Accuracy in itself does not provide information about the
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Figure 3: mean and standard deviation of the distance w.r.t.
time difference between groups of frames.
kinds of errors made by the algorithm. For that purpose, we
define two supplementary metrics:
• True positive rate (TPR): number of burst sets from
devices using random MAC addresses correctly grouped
together, over the number of burst sets from devices
using random MAC addresses,
• False positive rate (FPR): number of burst sets incor-
rectly grouped with burst sets from other devices, over
the total number of burst sets.
TPR gives a better insight about positive results related
to devices using random MAC addresses only. FPR shows
the ratio of undesirable errors made by the algorithm (burst
sets from different devices grouped together). In an attack,
a false positive may lead to a device being taken for another
one. As a result, the actual device may not be detected,
while the other device may be missed. Nevertheless, such
errors will only be significant if they appear on a long num-
ber of successive burst sets, as they could be detected by
human judgement or a filtering algorithm otherwise.
4.5 Performances as a function of the thresh-
old
We plot the performance of our algorithm with the 3 dis-
tances as a function of the distance threshold t, summa-
rized in a ROC curve (Figure 4). With distance D1, we
observe a maximum for the accuracy metrics for t = 0.4,
with accuracy = 62.7%. Increasing the distance threshold
then increases both true positive and false positive rates.
With distance D2, our false positive rate stays close to 0.
Thanks to this, we can afford higher values of t, for which
the FPR stays much smaller than 1%. However, our TPR
is not as good as with distance D1, and our algorithm fails
to find the original MAC address for more than half groups
of frames using random MAC addresses. With distance D1,
we could succeed for more than 70% of such groups, at a
cost of a high FPR.
Further investigations show that higher values of t (such
as 10) do not modify the results anymore. As a result, with
distance D2, the value of t can be taken arbitrarily high for
optimal results.
As expected, distance D3 appears to be a good trade-off
between D1 and D2: results values for TPR and FPR lie
between those of D1 and D2.
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of threshold values.
4.6 Knowledge-keeping algorithm evaluation
We evaluate our knowledge-keeping algorithm (see sec-
tion 3.4) on our 3 distances.
As this method is more prone to error accumulation, it is
not surprising that the best results are given by distance D2,
which yields almost no false positive. Distance D3 becomes
victim of this error accumulation for high values of t, due
to a higher FPR, and sees an accuracy drop of about 8%.
Performances for distance D1 are definitely worse, with a
fall in accuracy of about 18%. Performances for distance
D2 are almost equal with both strategies (the difference is
less than 0.01%).
To sum up, the knowledge-keeping algorithm does not im-
prove performances but has the potential to make them drop
in some cases.
4.7 Influence of the parameters
In order to improve the results of the algorithm, we evalu-
ate the influence of several parameters on its efficiency: size
of the bins, number of future bursts.
4.7.1 Temporal granularity/Size of the bins
To build our signatures for the MAC addresses, we dis-
cretize time by forming bins of fixed size. We vary the size
of these bins used to calculate the distance between groups
of frames, from 1µs to 1s. What appears is that the size of
the bins does not matter much, as long as it is bigger than
a threshold of 50ms to 300ms, depending on the distance
used. bins smaller than this threshold result in a lower accu-
racy. The best results are obtained with bins of size 670ms
which an accuracy of 76.2%. Tests for higher values (1 to
5s) do not yield better results.
4.7.2 Number of future bursts
We attempt to use our algorithm with harder conditions:
instead of considering all frames with the same MAC address
to build signatures, we only take the first N bursts in time,
with N from 1 to 5. The aim of this harder condition is to
see if our algorithm can be used in near real-time, where the
amount of information is reduced to a small timeframe.
Results are presented in Figure 5. Not fetching bursts of
probe requests in the future yields a drop of 40% in the ac-
curacy of our algorithm. Actually, no probe request with a
random MAC address is classified correctly (TPR = 0). The
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Figure 5: Influence of the number of future bursts fetched
for distance D2.
Table 1: Results of the attack with the best parameters and
options.
Distance Accuracy TPR FPR
D1 66.8% 74.1% 24.3%
D2 77.2% 64.0% 0.6%
D3 71.8% 75.2% 17.5%
accuracy of 40% is only due to probe requests not using ran-
dom MAC addresses not being grouped with other frames.
This shows that our algorithm fails to classify groups of only
one burst of frames. With two groups of frames or more, re-
sults become usable with a drop in accuracy of less than
20%. Above 4 groups of bursts, results don’t vary since we
simulate devices using random MAC addresses by random-
izing groups of 4 bursts.
4.8 Other parameters and options
This section ends the discussion about the tested param-
eters. We evaluate the effectiveness of the two options pre-
sented in section 3.2. We observe an increase of 2 to 3% for
the 3 distances with the oﬄine algorithm.
We evaluate our k-NN method (see section 3.5) with the
3 distances. 1-NN corresponds to the default behaviour,
where we only consider the closest group of frames. Results
show that this method is not more efficient for any value of
k greater than 1: tests on the values of k from 2 to 10 on
the 3 distances yield a ratio decrease of 1 to 30%.
For the choice of the constant used for distance D3, we
calculate accuracy, TPR and FPR for various values of this
constant, ranging from 1 to 100. 10 appears to be the best
choice for this constant as it maximizes accuracy.
4.9 Results summary
Our estimated best parameters are: t = 0.4 for distance
D1, t = 2.0 for distances D2 and D3, bins of size 670ms, of-
fline algorithm, not using the knowledge-keeping algorithm.
With these parameters, we obtain results presented in Ta-
ble 1. D2 appears to yield both the best accuracy and the
lowest FPR, whereas D3 yields the best TPR. Depending
on the conditions, D2 or D3 may be considered the best
distance metric.
5. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an attack capable of tracking
Wi-Fi devices over time despite the use of MAC address
randomization mechanisms. Our timing-based attack is able
to successfully group together frames originating from the
same device, but having a distinct MAC address pseudonym
in 77.2% of the cases.
This new class of attack shows that owners of Wi-Fi de-
vices are exposed to tracking. Furthermore, it demonstrates
that the content of Wi-Fi frames is not even necessary in
order to track devices.
Based on our observations and the results of our exper-
iments, we can devise several countermeasures that would
reduce the effectiveness of the attack presented in this pa-
per. First, changing the MAC address more often, e.g. ev-
ery burst or every frame, has the potential to reduce the
trackability of devices, as the amount of information for fin-
gerprinting will be limited to a few frames. Then, since our
attack relies on temporal pattern, a simple countermeasure
would be to break those patterns by introducing some ran-
dom delays between probes and between bursts.
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